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need a reason to delay. Because this is part of my temperament, I find it
hard to agree with Mawson and Sartre about the value of self-creative
autonomy. Mawson writes that “Sartrean meaningfulness” is “a sense of
meaningfulness that in and of itself we rightly value” (123). However, I do
not regard self-creative autonomy as an intrinsic good. It seems to me to
have no more than instrumental value. This is because what I ultimately
value is perfect happiness, and I think of it as experiences of nothing but
pleasure (disclosure: while I am not a hedonist, I am a hedonist about
happiness). Thus, were I to be perfectly happy, I would not care the least
about possessing self-creative autonomy or free will. I value having free
will and, by implication, self-creative autonomy only to the extent that it
provides me with good reason to think and hope that I might be able to
do something to remove myself from a situation in life that is less than appealing. But perfect happiness could never be to any degree unappealing.
Moreover, it is because I think of perfect happiness as the experience of
nothing but pleasure that I am unpersuaded by the objection (standardly
traced to Bernard Williams) that eternal bliss would become boring. How
could the experience of pleasure be boring? Mawson also finds the “boredom” objection wanting: “And surely worshipping God in the full glory
of the beatific vision would not be boredom-worthy” (141). Absolutely so.
But I believe it is the pleasurable nature of that vision that makes clear
why it could not be boring.
It is because I part ways with Mawson (and Sartre) about the value of
self-creative autonomy that I in the end part ways with his polyvalent
amalgamist view that not all of the deeply valuable meanings of life are
jointly satisfiable. I believe that not having meaning in the Sartrean sense
in the heavenly end that is perfect happiness would not in any respect be
bad for us. What would be bad for us is my failing to commend once again
Mawson’s book. It is the gold standard among works on the meaning of life.

Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life, edited by Stephen Minister, J. Aaron
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Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life presents recent work on love, faith, responsibility, and well-being in Kierkegaard. Several of the essays engage
somewhat unusual topics in the context of Kierkegaardian ethics, including early Christianity (Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria), Google,
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irony, and pentecostal philosophy. Several alternative accounts of love and
responsibility (those of Simone Weil, Anders Nygren, Immanuel Levinas,
and Dietrich von Hildebrand) are examined in detail and brought in to
illuminate Kierkegaard’s work. The collection is a valuable contribution to
scholarship on Kierkegaard’s ethics, and each essay is clear and engaging
enough to serve as an introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought, including
for advanced undergraduates. Some essays also offer close readings of
important but lesser known works by Kierkegaard, especially For SelfExamination and Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, in addition to new
perspectives on Works of Love and Fear and Trembling.
The editors describe the collection as addressing some persistent misunderstandings of Kierkegaard’s thought. His work is still considered
by some to either (1) have nothing to say about ethical issues or (2) offer
views of ethics and social life that are too individualistic or irrational. The
editors describe the book as aimed at
overcoming any facile view of Kierkegaard as being either irrelevant regarding such issues (due to the mistaken, but still widespread, interpretation of
Kierkegaard as being an irrationalist fideist with no concern for social existence) or even dangerous for social life itself (due to the mistaken, but still
occasionally found, view of Kierkegaard as being an immoralist). (x)

While this is a lot to take on, I think the collection makes strides in these
directions and certainly puts forward readings that, far from “facile,” embrace complex and subtle understandings of our human responsibilities
toward others. The essays demonstrate that Kierkegaard makes positive,
perhaps even indispensable, contributions to ethical thought. Rather than
challenging opponents or skeptics directly, the collection outpaces them
by presenting interpretations that are philosophically rich and make good
sense of Kierkegaard’s texts. The book’s constructive approach is effective:
Why spend time challenging those who claim Kierkegaard has no ethics
when there is so much Kierkegaardian ethics to talk about?
In addition to the two misunderstandings mentioned above, the editors also frame the book as addressing two specific areas in which the
relationship between “moral action and thinking about God” has become,
or has been perceived to have become, “deeply problematic” (ix). First,
they describe a tendency in Kierkegaard scholarship to “downplay the
orthodox religious aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought in order to make his
philosophy more relevant to contemporary trends,” such as postmodernism. Although they describe this kind of approach as a “current trend,”
postmodern readings are not particularly new, and it would be hard to
make the case that they are becoming more common. Louis Mackey’s incorporation of literary theory and Derrida’s philosophy in Kierkegaard: A
Kind of Poet appeared in 1971, nearly half a century (forty-six years) before this collection. And while the postmodern approach has continued
to have representatives since then (Roger Poole’s Kierkegaard: The Indirect
Communication [1993], the anthology The New Kierkegaard [2004], and John
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Caputo’s On Religion [2001, new edition this year] all come readily to
mind), these voices in the wider scope of Kierkegaard scholarship, while
influential, hardly constitute a trend. More recent starting points for reading Kierkegaard include engaging with work in contemporary analytic
philosophy (such as personal identity, immortality, epistemology, and
aesthetics) as well as reconsidering traditional views of Kierkegaard’s relationship to German Idealism. Given that one stated aim of the collection
is to move beyond postmodern interpretations, it is counterproductive to
treat postmodern interpretations to begin with as having so much clout.
On the other hand, while neither new nor dominant, postmodern approaches are well worth engaging. The strongest, most sustained discussion of a postmodern view in the collection is Strawser’s engagement with
Mackey on love; Simmons also briefly discusses Caputo, though one of
the more interesting critiques is buried in a footnote of his chapter. In any
case, I hope new readers will not come away with the idea that the authors
in this volume are an embattled minority rather the leading, trend-setting
voices they in fact are. While many contemporary scholars do not treat
Kierkegaard as a religious thinker, there have been and remain a good
many that do. Rather than a solution to an emerging problem, I think the
collection is better understood as a set of noteworthy and welcome additions to a well-represented tradition. The book advances ideas from a
similar collection edited by Mooney a decade ago (Ethics, Love, and Faith in
Kierkegaard, 2008), with essays by some of the same authors (Davenport,
Furtak, Piety, and Mooney) and offering in-depth discussions of other
contributors to the earlier volume (Pattison, Roberts, and Ferreira).
The second point the editors describe as “increasingly prominent” is
the “intersection between religious existence and social life,” including
as it impacts political contexts (ix). The essays offer helpful foundations
for addressing contemporary socio-political questions rather than direct
applications to contemporary issues (with the exception of the essay on
Google). The collection shows that Kierkegaard “offers profound resources for contemporary existence, not despite his religious commitments, but precisely because of them” (ix) and “offer[s] reasons to think
that there are no simple answers when it comes to understanding Kierkegaard’s complex, theologically oriented authorship and its ethical impact”
(ix–x). The authors’ integration of Kierkegaard’s ethics into his thinking
as a whole also demonstrates that “to think about Kierkegaard’s God requires thinking seriously about what the good life is and should be” (xvii)
and moreover asks readers to respond to a call to “engaged living” (xviii).
The overall impression there is something (or many things) one ought to
go out and do after reading Kierkegaard is part of the unusual energy and
importance of the collection.
The book consists of three main parts. In the first part, “Faith and
Love,” the essays examine the intersection of love, the good life, and their
shared foundation in God. One distinguishing feature of this first group
of essays is their in-depth engagement with other thinkers, including Leo
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Tolstoy (Krishek), Anders Nygren (Søltoft and Davenport), Dietrich von
Hildebrand (Davenport), and Simone Weil (Tietjen and Mooney). Sharon
Krishek argues that Kierkegaard offers an explanation for the brief peace
experienced by Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych at the end of his life, left unexplained
by Tolstoy. According to Kierkegaard, love is the highest achievement of
a good life, and his own potential to love is what Ilyich finally realizes.
Michael Strawser characterizes the activity of relating to others through
love, rather than passively enjoying eternal happiness, as the highest good
in Kierkegaard, arguing that “the good life on Earth must be our primary
affirmation” (27). Pia Søltoft shows ways in which agapic neighbor love, as
a kind of passion, need not be separated from erotic love, contra Nygren’s
view. John Davenport addresses the same problem of preferential (or
“special”) loves and love of neighbor, arguing (like Søltoft ) that erotic and
agapic loves need not be opposed, suggesting instead that special loves
can be “infused” with agapic love. Mark Tietjen takes on the provocative
question of whether the good life requires Christian theism, concluding
that Christianity offers a strong justification for the aim of equality. He
argues for “agapic moral fideism,” which expects to find love in others we
can never fully confirm.
Part 2, “Moral Psychology and Ethical Existence,” examines the relationship between faith and moral development. John Lippitt argues that
the virtue of humility is not self-effacement but rather self-confidence that
facilitates gratitude, as a disposition not to experience negative emotions
related to competition. Lippitt articulates a complex network of virtues:
humility and gratitude motivate contentment and joy and are expressed
through hope and patience, which in turn communicate humility as trust
in goodness beyond one’s own power and understanding. Rick Furtak’s
essay reveals how affections and moods influence our perception of reality, and in fact contribute to constituting that reality; a purely dispassionate approach to knowledge would fail to understand the world as
it really is. Furtak includes extended analogies to acknowledging one’s
own mortality and recognizing the value of one who has died, noting
that it can be difficult to appreciate the positive qualities of existence until
they are lost or threatened. Christopher Barnett proposes a similarity between Google’s aim of making information accessible and Hegel’s system
of knowledge, proposing contemplation (Betragtning) as an antidote to
both. Lastly, Stephen Minister describes how Levinas seeks to reconcile
his gratitude toward individual Christian who reached out to vulnerable
Jews with the “coexistence of the rise of National Socialism and the Holocaust with Christianity’s dominance in Europe” (153). Minister suggests
that Kierkegaard, while having more to say about ethics than many think,
is still subject to Levinas’s criticisms of him and of Christianity more generally. Namely, Levinas points out the troubling reality that individuals
must often rely on the loving sacrifices of others when structural justice
has failed them, and neither Kierkegaard nor Christianity place enough
emphasis on structural justice.
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The essays of the third part, “Existence Before God,” offer more specific recommendations for living a good life and for further thinking
about religion and philosophy (though again, not mainly by addressing
contemporary issues directly). Edward Mooney affirms the importance
of gratitude and thinks of faith as offering a kind of resilience, which he
describes as an ability “to weather disruptions and to stay open to marvels” (188). Mooney’s essay focuses on self-deception as the main obstacle
to such resilience, offering a Kierkegaardian account of how and why it
occurs. Marilyn G. Piety argues that knowledge is essential to love (referencing Furtak as one of the few to recognize this) and provides an account
of knowledge in Kierkegaard, describing faith as providing a “foundation
for Christian knowledge, just as sensory experience provides the foundation for empirical knowledge” (197). She emphasizes such knowledge is
always embedded in concrete life and that living a good life cannot be
separated from the quest for truth. Grant Julin undertakes an exploration
of Job’s suffering, drawing attention to Job’s inner relation to himself (in
contrast with his degree of correctness against God), which can similarly
apply to how we understand ourselves before God. Finally, Aaron Simmons contributes to both Kierkegaard studies and pentecostal philosophy,
arguing that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is “understood productively in relation to Pentecostalism” (xvii). Making use of guideposts for pentecostal
philosophy provided by James K. A. Smith, and then examining William J.
Seymour and Kierkegaard in this light, Simmons shows the importance of
the Holy Spirit in Kierkegaard’s writings, where Christianity transforms
the world by “breathing different air” (241), offering new ways of “inhabiting the world and relating to our neighbors within it” (243).
There are other interesting strains in the book that are not named as
themes, including incorporations of phenomenology in the chapters by
Søltoft , Strawser, and Furtak, and indirectly in Mooney’s discussion of
self-deception (with a brief mention of Sartre). Emphasizing Kierkegaard’s
roots in phenomenology (e.g., Hegelianism) and similarities with twentieth-century phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Furtak)
offers a promising alternative to postmodern interpretations (as I have
also argued) by showing how Kierkegaard reveals universal structures of
experience. Another unmarked strain is the reappearance in different essays of the parable of the lilies of the field and the birds of the air as retold
in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (in chapters by Tietjen, Lippitt,
and Barnett, the latter two referencing George Pattison). The recurrence
suggests there is something timely and perhaps yet unresolved in this set
of parables as retold by Kierkegaard, and I hope they will be taken up by
yet more readers and scholars.
I also hope someone will take up and respond to Minister’s Levinasian
challenge to Kierkegaard (and Christianity in general) which, while carefully qualified, goes more or less unanswered by any essay in the volume. One observation I do have about the Levinasian challenge (namely,
that Kierkegaard pays little attention to political justice, but that ethics
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does require this wider concern), is that Minister’s critique of Kierkegaard
draws mainly on Practice in Christianity, where it is likely that Kierkegaard
presents an exaggerated fictional viewpoint more extreme than his own.
(Pattison has described its pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, as a “hyperChristian” in George Pattison, “Philosophy and Dogma: The Testimony
of an Upbuilding Discourse,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed.
Edward F. Mooney [Indiana University Press, 2008], 155–162.) Throughout his essay, Minister attributes the quotations to Kierkegaard (rather
than the character Anti-Climacus), which is unusual. The issue of citing
pseudonyms is especially relevant in the context of engaging with postmodernism, since Poole faulted “blunt” theological readings for neglecting to read with literary sensitivity, and in particular for failing to be
mindful of differences among pseudonyms. (Roger Poole, “‘My Wish, My
Prayer’: Keeping the Pseudonyms Apart,” in Kierkegaard Revisited: Proceedings from the Conference ‘The Meaning of Meaning It,’ edited by Niels Jorgen
Cappelorn and Jon Stewart [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997], 156–176, and
Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication [Charlottesville: University Press
of Virginia, 1993].) While Minister appeals to the example of the charwoman from Works of Love to confirm that a passive approach to structural
justice and material well-being is found throughout Kierkegaard’s work, I
doubt as strong a case could be made against Kierkegaard if the “hyper”
claims by Anti-Climacus are read as made by a fictional character, like
Ivan’s speeches in The Brothers Karamazov or Ivan Ilych’s point of view in
Tolstoy’s short story. I think adding more textual subtlety here would in
the end support Minister’s project of making political justice more central
to ethics: it could mean Kierkegaard agrees with Levinas on the importance of social goodness (and not just inner goodness) even more than is
usually thought. On the other hand, it may just be that Kierkegaard (and
Christianity) are ethically weaker here than Levinas (and Judaism). If so,
is this merely a difference in emphasis, or is a neglect of material conditions essential to Kierkegaard’s thought and perhaps to Christianity more
broadly? How would this challenge affect our understanding of other
essays in the volume?
These are hard questions, revealing some healthy disagreement among
contributors. It would be difficult to dismiss the essays in this collection as
the “blunt” theological readings criticized by Poole. Overall, the authors
embrace tension and difficulty with courage and hope. In the care taken
with the ideas of others, in the concern to make love and justice more
central to our understanding of Kierkegaard and Christian ethics, and in
the goal of offering new positive directions for religious thinking, the collection is both effective and admirable. Each essay merits and rewards
careful attention, and the volume as a whole is a valuable resource for
examining the roles of love and faith in the quest for a good life.

